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Sixth Circuit Moves The Ball Forward For Companies Seeking FICA Tax Refunds On Supplemental Unemployment Compensation Benefit Payments

January 8, 2013

By Phil Karter and John Hackney

For companies that have implemented employee layoffs in the past several years and made severance payments to terminated employees, the prospect of eligibility for federal tax refunds for any FICA taxes withheld from such payments took another step forward with the Sixth Circuit’s January 4th denial of the government’s petition for rehearing en banc in United States v. Quality Stores (Civil No. 10-1563, 6th Cir. 2012).

The rehearing petition was filed after a government loss in September of last year in which the appellate court affirmed a lower court’s decision that supplemental unemployment compensation benefit (SUB) payments are not taxable as wages and are consequently exempt from FICA taxes. Under section 3402(o)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, SUB payments are defined as “amounts which are paid to an employee, pursuant to a plan to which the employer is a party, because of an employee’s involuntary separation from employment (whether or not such separation is temporary), resulting directly from a reduction in force, the discontinuance of a plant or operation, or other similar conditions.”

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Quality Stores directly conflicts with the Federal Circuit’s prior decision in CSX Corp. v. United States, 518 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008), which held that such payments were subject to FICA.  With the denial of the petition for rehearing in Quality Stores, the stage is now set for the government to seek Supreme Court review.  Because the eventual outcome of this conflict has enormous financial implications, a petition for certiorari is reasonably foreseeable.  Such a petition would be due by April 4, 2013.

Although the final word on the issue may not yet be written, for companies located within the Sixth Circuit’s purview (Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio and Tennessee), the taxpayer-friendly Quality Stores decision is currently binding authority which, unless reversed by the Supreme Court, will entitle those who have filed timely refund claims to the refund of FICA taxes paid over on SUB payments. In the rest of the country, Quality Stores is not binding on the IRS.  Nonetheless, the case at least raises the prospect of a taxpayer victory on the issue when the dust finally settles.

Many companies have already filed protective tax refund claims to preserve their rights to receive potentially significant refunds of FICA tax.  For those that haven’t, filing such claims for each open taxable year in which FICA was withheld on SUB payments is an absolute prerequisite to obtain any refunds. There is little cost associated with filing a protective refund claim but the potential benefit could be quite large.  Accordingly, any eligible employers who have not already done so are advised to file their claims as soon as possible for all open years to avoid being barred by the applicable statute of limitations, which typically remains open for the later of three years after the return due date or two years after the date of payment.

A final point about which employers filing refund claims should take note is that under Treas. Reg. § 31.6402(a)-2, a refund claim seeking the refund or credit of an employee’s share of FICA taxes requires the employer to certify either that it has repaid or reimbursed the tax to its employee or that it has secured the employee’s written consent to the filing of the refund claim (except to the extent the taxes were not withheld from the employee).  In Quality Stores, for example, roughly 1,800 of 3,000 former employees consented to the company filing FICA tax refund claims on their behalf.  Consequently, the employer’s refund claim for its own share of FICA taxes exceeded the refund sought for its former employees’ share.

Squib Note: Clarifying the 2013 Capital Gains Rates

January 2, 2013

It has been universally reported that under the newly passed American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, net capital gain tax rates have risen to 20% for taxpayers with taxable income greater than $400,000 for single filers and $450,000 for joint filers.  To clarify this broad statement, under section 102 of the new law, the higher capital gains rate applies only to the gain that, when added to other taxable income, exceeds the threshold amounts.  Taxpayers below the 39.6% taxable income threshold before capital gains are taken into account will have their capital gains taxed at 15% up to the taxable income threshold and 20% on the excess.  The following two examples illustrate how the net capital gain tax rate is calculated:

In Example 1, joint taxpayers earn $400,000 of ordinary income and another $200,000 in net capital gains.  Under the new law, the first $50,000 of net capital gains is taxed at the lower rate, with the remaining $150,000 taxed at the higher rate.  The effective rate of 18.75% reflects the blending of the 15% and 20% rates.

2013 Capital Gain Rate Example 1

In Example 2, joint taxpayers now earn $200,000 of ordinary income and another $400,000 in net capital gains.  Because a greater portion of the taxpayers’ taxable income has shifted from ordinary income to net capital gain, the effective net capital gain rate is lower than the previous example because a greater portion of the taxpayer’s below-the-threshold income is taxed at the 15% rate, leaving a smaller remainder subject to the 20% tax.

2013 Capital Gain Rate Example 2

The above examples do not take into account the new 3.8 % medicare surtax on capital gains (and other net investment income) imposed by section 1411 of the Internal Revenue Code. Because the income threshold under that section is lower than the 39.6% tax rate threshold ($200,000 for single filers and $250,000 for joint filers), the surtax would apply to the entire net capital gain amounts in both examples, resulting in an effective rate of 22.55% and 20.68% respectively.

Could The New Economic Substance Statute Apply To End-Of-Year Stock Sales And Repurchases?

December 28, 2012

By Phil Karter

With the looming increase in tax rates on investment income and capital gains in particular, a large number of stock market investors have been selling long-term positions to lock in the 2012 rate, which currently tops out at 15%.  Come January 1,2013, gain on the same sale could be taxed at a rate as high as 23.8%, consisting of a long-term capital gains tax rate of 20% plus a Medicare surtax of 3.8% imposed on joint filers with AGI greater than $250,000 and single filers with AGI greater than $200,000.  (See Internal Revenue Code § 1411).

A question attracting attention as the year draws to a close and the pace of this activity has accelerated has been whether a stock sale undertaken solely to take advantage of the lower 2012 capital gains tax rates might fall within the scope of Code § 7701(o), the relatively new economic substance statute codified as part of the landmark Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029).  Concerns about coming within the scope of this statute are that it might subject the investor to a 20% penalty enacted as part of the new law.  See Code § 6662(b)(6).  The penalty, if applicable, is a “strict liability” one, which means that taxpayers cannot avoid it on grounds of reasonable cause, such as reliance on a tax advisor. (The penalty for a transaction determined to lack economic substance is also increased to a whopping 40% if the transaction is undisclosed.  See Code § 6662(i).  However, as long as a taxpayer reports the transaction on his or her tax return, the 40% penalty should not apply.)

Thankfully, the eleventh hour concerns expressed about this issue should be put to rest for stock investment gain-recognition transactions in 2012.  Even assuming the economic substance statute is conceptually broad enough to ensnare stock sale transactions undertaken to lock in lower capital gains tax rates, the penalty is only applicable to “underpayments.”  Because a long-term capital gain recognized in 2012 does not reduce a taxpayer’s taxable income but rather increases it (unless the gain is offset by otherwise unused capital losses), there is no underpayment against which to apply a penalty.

Now let’s vary the circumstances by introducing a simultaneous buyback of the stock at the time of sale to reestablish the same position.  Does that change anything vis a vis a potential penalty risk?  We still have a gain recognition transaction in 2012, so there is no tax underpayment against which a penalty could apply for this year.  As for the repurchased stock, its cost basis is at the repurchase price, which means that a subsequent sale in a future year will either produce a smaller taxable gain or larger taxable loss than would have occurred had the original share lots with their lower cost basis simply been maintained.  Some have speculated that this could produce a tax underpayment against which the strict liability economic substance penalty might apply in the year of sale.  After all, in defining a transaction that has economic substance, § 7701(o) requires (1) that the transaction change in a “meaningful way” the taxpayer’s economic position apart from federal tax benefits, and (2) that the taxpayer have a non-tax purpose for entering into the transaction.

In theory, a sale and instantaneous repurchase might fail to satisfy both of these tests.  On the other hand, a repurchase transaction that occurs sometime after the sale introduces an element of market risk from stock price fluctuation that should mitigate any penalty risk.  Similarly, a repurchase in a different type of account (e.g., in a tax-deferred account where the original sale was in a taxable account or vice versa) should also put the taxpayer on firmer ground.

So what are the real risks that the IRS might choose some unfortunate taxpayers to assert a strict liability penalty?  It has, after all, been less than forthcoming in providing guidance on what types of plain vanilla transactions, if any, may be viewed as falling within the scope of the new economic substance statute.  Perhaps the best indicator one can draw upon is the title of § 7701(o), “Clarification of Economic Substance Doctrine.”  The codified doctrine has been portrayed as merely a clarification of the economic substance law in effect for transactions entered into before March 30, 2010. Under the pre-codification doctrine, which is derived solely from the common law, there do not appear to be any reported economic substance cases involving a taxpayer’s sale and repurchase transaction that results in accelerated gain recognition. Couple this with the fact that no court has been asked to interpret the breadth of the new economic substance statute since it was passed in 2010, and it is reasonable to believe that the IRS would prefer to choose a different, and presumably more compelling battleground to make its first stand defending the application of Section 7701(o) and the strict liability penalty.

Finally, in the case of a 2012 gain-recognition stock sale and simultaneous repurchase, it cannot be entirely certain that the transaction will even produce a tax savings when all is said and done.  This is because of the difference between the tax rates for long and short term capital gains (which are taxed at ordinary income rates).  Because a new holding period is established for the repurchased stock, it remains possible that the stock, when sold, will produce a short-term capital gain subject to a larger tax burden than might have occurred if if the original long-term position was held into 2013 or beyond.  In the end, the lack of certainty about the ultimate tax effect until the second sale occurs may be taxpayers’ best argument that the sale and repurchase transaction had economic substance after all.

Musings in the Aftermath of the First Schedule UTP Filing Season

December 8, 2011

By Phil Karter

As reported earlier this week in the tax press, the recently completed initial filing season for Schedule UTP produced at least one major surprise in the eyes of IRS officials, who had anticipated a much greater number of items listed on the average Schedule UTP than actually materialized.  In fact, the IRS’s predictions were off by a wide margin, with the number of disclosed positions of the 1,500 or so Schedule UTPs filed averaging only slightly more than three items per schedule for CIC taxpayers, and less than two items for non-CIC taxpayers.  Pre-filing expectations of item disclosures had been many multiples higher, perhaps even reaching as high as 100 or more separately stated positions.  Although such predictions may have been wildly optimistic from the IRS’s standpoint, one must now wonder whether the apparent failure of the first filing season to meet the Service’s anticipated disclosure bonanza will hasten efforts to extend the penalty regime to specifically target what are viewed as incomplete or inadequate disclosures on Schedule UTP. (more…)

The Reporting Requirements for Deferred Tax Assets Under Schedule UTP: IRS Instructions Muddy The Waters

November 23, 2010

By Phil Karter and Jonathan Prokup

One of our readers recently emailed us with a question about the application of the new Schedule UTP to deferred tax assets.  The question is straightforward enough: must uncertain positions involving deferred tax assets be reported on Schedule UTP and, if so, when must they be reported?  The explanation, thanks to confusion created by several examples in the final Schedule UTP instructions, is anything but straightforward.  Let’s start with a little background.

(more…)

The Tax Workpapers Conundrum – Will “Justice” Kagan Accept What Solicitor General Kagan Opposed?

July 1, 2010

By Phil Karter

In Tuesday’s confirmation hearings for Supreme Court nominee Elena Kagan, one topic on which there appeared to be agreement between the nominee and the panel was concern about the dwindling number of cases heard by the High Court. In response to questioning from Senator Arlen Specter, Kagan had no explanation for the precipitous decline in the Court’s docket over the last 20 years, but agreed that it has led to an increase in unresolved conflicts among the circuit courts on “vital national issues.”

Quite naturally, those of us in the tax field like to think of our livelihoods as involving “vital national issues,” so perhaps we take it a little personally when the Supreme Court appears to hold a different perspective. The Court certainly surprised many tax professionals in May by declining to hear the Textron case, which presented one of the most prominent “hot-button” tax issues to come along in years. What perfect irony (and timing) it was then on the heels of Kagan’s congressional testimony for the issuance of a decision by the D.C. Circuit the same day in United States v. Deloitte LLP et al., No. 09-5171, that once again accentuated the differing views of the circuit courts on an issue of considerable importance to tax professionals. (more…)

Squib Notes: Venerable “Kovel Rule” May Be Under New Attack

May 10, 2010

By Phil Karter

For almost 50 years, lawyers have relied on the “Kovel Rule” to extend the attorney-client privilege to non-testifying accountants or other business experts.   The philosophy behind the rule, so named after the landmark case, United States v. Kovel, 296 F. 2d 918 (2nd. Cir. 1961), is to recognize “the complexities of modern existence [which] prevent attorneys from effectively handling clients’ affairs without the help of others . . . .”  Id. at 921.  Without such a rule, disclosure to a third party would constitute a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.

In practice, the Kovel Rule has been ubiquitously employed by lawyers who engage other professionals to assist them in rendering render legal advice.  Most typically, the lawyer engages the third-party professional by means of a written engagement, known as “Kovel Agreement.”  Where the third-party is first contacted directly by the client rather than through the lawyer, a greater level of scrutiny about whether the privilege attaches typically ensues because of concern over whether the professional’s advice is really necessary for the lawyer to render legal advice.  For example, a previous relationship between a client and the third-party consultant, or a direct relationship, can be viewed as evidence the third-party is merely performing consulting work rather than facilitating the lawyer’s ability to render legal advice.  See e.g., In re G-I Holdings Inc. 218 F.R.D. 428 (D. N.J. 2003).

Kovel is not without its detractors, and courts have nibbled at its edges for years.  However, a recent comment by a senior IRS Chief Counsel attorney at last week’s ABA Tax Section meeting suggests a full frontal assault may be in the cards.  The official, Janet Johnson, Deputy Division Counsel for Criminal Tax, stated, “We will take the position that the accountant is independently working and not covered by privilege.” How the government intends to argue in favor of a blanket reversal of Kovel remains to be seen, but a word to the wise is that such arrangements should be carefully crafted and contemporaneously documented.  Once in place, due care should be taken to ensure that the formalities of the lawyer-consultant relationship are meticulously observed.  Clients, in turn, should have a clear understanding about the nature and purpose of Kovel relationships particularly in the event there is direct interaction with the third-party professional.  Lastly, when the third-party professional is an accountant, it is unclear how, if at all, the privilege for accountant-client communications, established in 1998 under Section 7525 of the Internal Revenue Code, would be implicated by the frontal assault contemplated by Ms. Johnson.   At this point, all we can say with certainty is stay tuned.

Trust but Verify – Proposed Schedule UTP and the Implications to Attorney Work Product

April 20, 2010

By Phil Karter

Last week, at the TEI Midyear Conference in Washington, LMSB Commissioner Heather Maloy told corporate tax executives attending the conference that “trust” was the key to successfully implementing the new reporting requirements for uncertain tax positions first set forth in Announcement 2010-9.  As reported in the April 14th edition of Tax Notes, 2010 TNT 71-2, Maloy also told the attendees that enhanced transparency through the use of this reporting mechanism would be “mutually beneficial” in terms of improved issue resolution and efficiency.

Last month, I commented on an aspect of Announcement 2010-9 that had received relatively little attention, namely the requirement that taxpayers must file the new disclosure form not only when recording a reserve in their financial statements, but also when expecting to litigate “uncertain tax positions” even if no reserves are recorded.  (For earlier commentary, click here.)  The concern I articulated was whether the failure to disclose a tax position for which no reserve was claimed would precipitate an attack on taxpayer claims of work product, which rely on an “anticipation of litigation” standard.

The proposed new Schedule UTP and its accompanying instructions, released in draft format yesterday, don’t help us much in forecasting an answer to this question.  A single example of the expectation to litigate is provided in the proposed instructions:

A corporation takes a position that it can exclude certain income from its 2010 tax return.  On September 30, 2010, the corporation determines that, if the IRS had full knowledge of the tax position, there is less than a 50% probability of settling the issue with the IRS.  The corporation also determines that, if the tax position were litigated, it has a 60% probability of prevailing in the litigation.  Based upon these determinations, the corporation did not record a reserve for the tax position.  Because the corporation made a decision not to record a reserve with respect to its 2010 tax position based on a determination, consistent with applicable accounting standards, that it will litigate, rather than settle, the issue with the IRS and that the corporation will prevail in the litigation, and because that decision was made more than 60 days before filing its 2010 tax return, the corporation must report this tax position on the Schedule UTP filed with its 2010 tax return.

On its face, the lesson from this example seems clear enough.  A taxpayer who concludes it has a more likely than not chance of winning an issue in litigation should recognize the entire tax benefit in its financial statements under FIN 48 and claim no reserve.

Nonetheless, the unlikelihood of settling an issue the taxpayer believes is better than a 50% bet means that litigation is a virtual certainty unless the dollars involved do not justify the litigation cost.  How can a taxpayer afford not to file Schedule UTP in that instance and still feel assured that any legal analysis of the issue retains its protected status as attorney work product?  The answer is that it can’t – at least not without clarification from the Service about whether and when an attack on work product claims will be raised if the Schedule is not filed (or a working assumption that work product protection may not attach).  Even that may not be enough.  In refund suits, litigation strategy is the province of the DOJ Tax Division.  Absent the public articulation of a coordinated and consistent policy of restraint over when and when not to dispute work product claims on the basis of a taxpayer’s failure to file Schedule UTP, taxpayers can take little comfort that they won’t wind up in a discovery dispute over legal analysis that has been traditionally the beneficiary of robust protection from disclosure.  Of course, that may all be part of the plan.  Nonetheless, the ability to “trust” the push toward greater disclosure may require the Service and DOJ to “verify” their ultimate intentions.

Finally, consider the circumstances where a taxpayer believes it is “spot-on” on an issue that has been litigated successfully by other taxpayers before, only to be challenged again, perhaps in another jurisdiction.  Such a case would not require the establishment of a reserve and the taxpayer may have had good reason to believe the issue would not be challenged or, if challenged, would likely be settled favorably.  Should a Schedule UTP be filed in that instance?  Arguably not, but how does a taxpayer prove it believed litigation was unlikely?  Such a circumstance is arguably a classic Catch-22.  On one hand, the taxpayer needs to document the basis for its analysis that litigation was unlikely to justify its decision not to file the schedule.  On the other hand, if the taxpayer’s prediction is wrong and the issue is disputed, it will be difficult to claim work product protection for the analysis because it is unlikely to satisfy the anticipation of litigation requirement.

The moral of the story is that a decision not to file Schedule UTP should be well documented, but with the working assumption that the legal analysis supporting the decision will likely be subject to disclosure if the matter ends up in litigation unless it fits under the umbrella of attorney-client privilege.

Son of BOSS Case Highlights Ongoing Dispute Over Application Of The Valuation Misstatement Penalty

March 12, 2010

By Phil Karter

The recent decision in Bemont Investments, LLC v. United States, USDC E.D. Tex., No. 4:07-cv-00009 (March 9, 2010) is another burr in the IRS’s saddle when it comes to enforcement of the substantial valuation and gross valuation misstatement penalties.  These two penalties, particularly the 40% gross valuation misstatement penalty, are powerful weapons in the IRS’s arsenal to deter taxpayers from entering into transactions the IRS considers abusive.  Bemont, out of the District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, was a Son of BOSS case that the IRS characterized as a sham transaction.

The taxpayer contended that under “well settled Fifth Circuit law,” a transaction characterized as a sham cannot involve a valuation misstatement resulting in a 20 percent or 40 percent penalty because under Fifth Circuit precedent, specifically Todd v. Comm’r, 862 F.2d 540, 541-42 (5th Cir. 1988), and Heasley v. Comm’r, 902 F.2d 380, 382-83 (5th Cir. 1990), these penalties are not applicable if the IRS’s disallowance of tax benefits is not “attributable to” a valuation misstatement.  Thus, the argument goes, the disallowance of the deduction is not an overstatement but a complete eradication of value.  The Ninth Circuit held similarly in Keller v. Comm’r, 556 F.3d 1056 (2009).

Unfortunately, the story doesn’t end there, particularly if the applicable jurisdiction for a dispute on this issue lies within the Second, Fourth, Sixth and Eighth Circuits.  In those circuits, the courts have held that the deficiency is attributable to an overstatement and that the penalty therefore applies.  (more…)


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