Archive for the ‘Tax Procedure’ category

Squib Note: The Opera Isn’t Over Yet on FICA Tax Refunds Until The Supreme Court Sings

April 3, 2013

By Phil Karter and John Hackney

In a blog posting earlier this year, we talked about the Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Quality Stores (Civil No. 10-1563, 6th Cir. 2012) affirming a lower court’s decision that supplemental unemployment compensation benefit (SUB) payments are not taxable as wages and are consequently exempt from FICA taxes. The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Quality Stores directly conflicts with the Federal Circuit’s prior decision in CSX Corp. v. United States, 518 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008), which held that such payments were subject to FICA.  For many employers who have filed protective refund claims, the favorable resolution of this conflict could result in meaningful refunds.

Those speculating on whether Quality Stores will be appealed to the Supreme Court, and whether the Supreme Court will grant certiorari, will have to wait a little longer to find out.  The original deadline for filing a petition for certiorari has been extended from April 4th to May 3, 2013.

Although the deadline for the government’s petition has been extended, the April 15, 2013 deadline to file protective refund claims for 2009 (the oldest eligible year) has not.  For employers that haven’t already done so, particularly those located within the Sixth Circuit (Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio and Tennessee), there is still a small amount of time left.

A final word of caution about deadlines:  If a protective FICA tax refund claim is denied, employers have two years from the date of denial to file a tax refund suit or obtain an extension of the two-year period by filing a Form 907.   Given the uncertainty over the final outcome of this issue, it is unclear whether the IRS will summarily deny protective refund claims or wait until the dust settles.  Nonetheless, employers whose refund claims are denied are well advised to keep track of the two-year deadline.  If the Supreme Court accepts certiorari, it may take that long before the final word on the subject is written.

Sixth Circuit Moves The Ball Forward For Companies Seeking FICA Tax Refunds On Supplemental Unemployment Compensation Benefit Payments

January 8, 2013

By Phil Karter and John Hackney

For companies that have implemented employee layoffs in the past several years and made severance payments to terminated employees, the prospect of eligibility for federal tax refunds for any FICA taxes withheld from such payments took another step forward with the Sixth Circuit’s January 4th denial of the government’s petition for rehearing en banc in United States v. Quality Stores (Civil No. 10-1563, 6th Cir. 2012).

The rehearing petition was filed after a government loss in September of last year in which the appellate court affirmed a lower court’s decision that supplemental unemployment compensation benefit (SUB) payments are not taxable as wages and are consequently exempt from FICA taxes. Under section 3402(o)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, SUB payments are defined as “amounts which are paid to an employee, pursuant to a plan to which the employer is a party, because of an employee’s involuntary separation from employment (whether or not such separation is temporary), resulting directly from a reduction in force, the discontinuance of a plant or operation, or other similar conditions.”

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Quality Stores directly conflicts with the Federal Circuit’s prior decision in CSX Corp. v. United States, 518 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008), which held that such payments were subject to FICA.  With the denial of the petition for rehearing in Quality Stores, the stage is now set for the government to seek Supreme Court review.  Because the eventual outcome of this conflict has enormous financial implications, a petition for certiorari is reasonably foreseeable.  Such a petition would be due by April 4, 2013.

Although the final word on the issue may not yet be written, for companies located within the Sixth Circuit’s purview (Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio and Tennessee), the taxpayer-friendly Quality Stores decision is currently binding authority which, unless reversed by the Supreme Court, will entitle those who have filed timely refund claims to the refund of FICA taxes paid over on SUB payments. In the rest of the country, Quality Stores is not binding on the IRS.  Nonetheless, the case at least raises the prospect of a taxpayer victory on the issue when the dust finally settles.

Many companies have already filed protective tax refund claims to preserve their rights to receive potentially significant refunds of FICA tax.  For those that haven’t, filing such claims for each open taxable year in which FICA was withheld on SUB payments is an absolute prerequisite to obtain any refunds. There is little cost associated with filing a protective refund claim but the potential benefit could be quite large.  Accordingly, any eligible employers who have not already done so are advised to file their claims as soon as possible for all open years to avoid being barred by the applicable statute of limitations, which typically remains open for the later of three years after the return due date or two years after the date of payment.

A final point about which employers filing refund claims should take note is that under Treas. Reg. § 31.6402(a)-2, a refund claim seeking the refund or credit of an employee’s share of FICA taxes requires the employer to certify either that it has repaid or reimbursed the tax to its employee or that it has secured the employee’s written consent to the filing of the refund claim (except to the extent the taxes were not withheld from the employee).  In Quality Stores, for example, roughly 1,800 of 3,000 former employees consented to the company filing FICA tax refund claims on their behalf.  Consequently, the employer’s refund claim for its own share of FICA taxes exceeded the refund sought for its former employees’ share.

Could The New Economic Substance Statute Apply To End-Of-Year Stock Sales And Repurchases?

December 28, 2012

By Phil Karter

With the looming increase in tax rates on investment income and capital gains in particular, a large number of stock market investors have been selling long-term positions to lock in the 2012 rate, which currently tops out at 15%.  Come January 1,2013, gain on the same sale could be taxed at a rate as high as 23.8%, consisting of a long-term capital gains tax rate of 20% plus a Medicare surtax of 3.8% imposed on joint filers with AGI greater than $250,000 and single filers with AGI greater than $200,000.  (See Internal Revenue Code § 1411).

A question attracting attention as the year draws to a close and the pace of this activity has accelerated has been whether a stock sale undertaken solely to take advantage of the lower 2012 capital gains tax rates might fall within the scope of Code § 7701(o), the relatively new economic substance statute codified as part of the landmark Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029).  Concerns about coming within the scope of this statute are that it might subject the investor to a 20% penalty enacted as part of the new law.  See Code § 6662(b)(6).  The penalty, if applicable, is a “strict liability” one, which means that taxpayers cannot avoid it on grounds of reasonable cause, such as reliance on a tax advisor. (The penalty for a transaction determined to lack economic substance is also increased to a whopping 40% if the transaction is undisclosed.  See Code § 6662(i).  However, as long as a taxpayer reports the transaction on his or her tax return, the 40% penalty should not apply.)

Thankfully, the eleventh hour concerns expressed about this issue should be put to rest for stock investment gain-recognition transactions in 2012.  Even assuming the economic substance statute is conceptually broad enough to ensnare stock sale transactions undertaken to lock in lower capital gains tax rates, the penalty is only applicable to “underpayments.”  Because a long-term capital gain recognized in 2012 does not reduce a taxpayer’s taxable income but rather increases it (unless the gain is offset by otherwise unused capital losses), there is no underpayment against which to apply a penalty.

Now let’s vary the circumstances by introducing a simultaneous buyback of the stock at the time of sale to reestablish the same position.  Does that change anything vis a vis a potential penalty risk?  We still have a gain recognition transaction in 2012, so there is no tax underpayment against which a penalty could apply for this year.  As for the repurchased stock, its cost basis is at the repurchase price, which means that a subsequent sale in a future year will either produce a smaller taxable gain or larger taxable loss than would have occurred had the original share lots with their lower cost basis simply been maintained.  Some have speculated that this could produce a tax underpayment against which the strict liability economic substance penalty might apply in the year of sale.  After all, in defining a transaction that has economic substance, § 7701(o) requires (1) that the transaction change in a “meaningful way” the taxpayer’s economic position apart from federal tax benefits, and (2) that the taxpayer have a non-tax purpose for entering into the transaction.

In theory, a sale and instantaneous repurchase might fail to satisfy both of these tests.  On the other hand, a repurchase transaction that occurs sometime after the sale introduces an element of market risk from stock price fluctuation that should mitigate any penalty risk.  Similarly, a repurchase in a different type of account (e.g., in a tax-deferred account where the original sale was in a taxable account or vice versa) should also put the taxpayer on firmer ground.

So what are the real risks that the IRS might choose some unfortunate taxpayers to assert a strict liability penalty?  It has, after all, been less than forthcoming in providing guidance on what types of plain vanilla transactions, if any, may be viewed as falling within the scope of the new economic substance statute.  Perhaps the best indicator one can draw upon is the title of § 7701(o), “Clarification of Economic Substance Doctrine.”  The codified doctrine has been portrayed as merely a clarification of the economic substance law in effect for transactions entered into before March 30, 2010. Under the pre-codification doctrine, which is derived solely from the common law, there do not appear to be any reported economic substance cases involving a taxpayer’s sale and repurchase transaction that results in accelerated gain recognition. Couple this with the fact that no court has been asked to interpret the breadth of the new economic substance statute since it was passed in 2010, and it is reasonable to believe that the IRS would prefer to choose a different, and presumably more compelling battleground to make its first stand defending the application of Section 7701(o) and the strict liability penalty.

Finally, in the case of a 2012 gain-recognition stock sale and simultaneous repurchase, it cannot be entirely certain that the transaction will even produce a tax savings when all is said and done.  This is because of the difference between the tax rates for long and short term capital gains (which are taxed at ordinary income rates).  Because a new holding period is established for the repurchased stock, it remains possible that the stock, when sold, will produce a short-term capital gain subject to a larger tax burden than might have occurred if if the original long-term position was held into 2013 or beyond.  In the end, the lack of certainty about the ultimate tax effect until the second sale occurs may be taxpayers’ best argument that the sale and repurchase transaction had economic substance after all.

If The Job Offer Includes A Loan From The Employer, Talk To Your Tax Adviser Before Accepting!

February 27, 2012

By George W. Connelly

It is not uncommon for sought-after job seekers to receive what appears to be an offer that is too good to be true:  in addition to a good compensation and benefits package, the employer proposes to make a loan to the applicant, and to forgive the entire amount if the person stays employed for a particular term—such as five years.  Sometimes the game plan is not in writing, and is left to “wink wink, nudge nudge” in terms of the likelihood that the loan will be forgiven if the person stays employed that length of time.

These arrangements are not in any way “illegal,” but as Robert and Elizabeth Brooks learned in the United States Tax Court this year, in TC Memo 2012-25, there are some significant tax problems that could arise from this arrangement.

At the outset, there is a question about whether the arrangement is really a “loan” when there is an intent to forgive in the first place.  A loan is a transaction where one person borrows money from the other, with the agreement that it will be repaid, and the lender expects repayment.  They are easily reduced to writing, bear interest, and are treated as loans by both parties.  Those facts alone, however, will not necessarily make the transaction a loan.

As Judge Mark Holmes pointed out in the Brooks case, such advances have in various contexts been treated as income at the outset because the Court concluded that the intent of the transaction was not a loan, but rather an attempt to induce the person to provide personal services, and the obligation to repay was conditional—only if the applicant quits or was fired for cause within five years.  In that situation, the “loan” could be treated as income in the year it is advanced.

In the case of Mr. and Mrs. Brooks, the Court was confronted with the tax year in which the loan was actually forgiven, and Judge Holmes noted that the Internal Revenue Code normally treats forgiveness of debt as income, since the borrower who does not have to pay it back has received an economic benefit.  This discharge of indebtedness income includes both the forgiven loan principal and the accrued interest.

In these situations, the old adage that “If it looks too good to be true, it probably is,” isn’t necessarily the point.  Rather, before one enters into a transaction like this, it is critical that the prospective employee pin down as closely as possible what the real intentions are, and then review them with a tax adviser.  A lot of trouble can be avoided if these steps are taken at the outset, rather than after the IRS comes in and questions the transaction.

The IRS Can Summons California For Property Transfer Records

December 20, 2011

As noted by Janet Novack at forbes.com, Judge England of the District Court for the Eastern District of California last week issued an order permitting the IRS to serve a “John Doe” summons on the California State Board of Equalization.  The summons seeks the names of residents who transferred property to relatives for little or no considerations.  The IRS hopes that the information it receives will identify individuals who should have, but did not, file Forms 709 – Gift Tax Returns. (more…)


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